The Telecom Industry as Cultural Industry? The Transposition of Fashion Logics into the Field of Mobile Telephony by Ainamo, Antti & Djelic, Marie-Laure
“The Telecom Industry as Cultural Industry? The 
Transposition of Fashion Logics into the Field of Mobile 
Telephony” 
Antti Ainamo and Marie-Laure Djelic 
Published in: http://www.emeraldinsight.com/books.htm?chapterid=1758667 
1 Introduction 
In its traditional acceptance, the term “fashion” triggers images of frivolous, quite 
irrational and relatively inconsequential swings in clothing styles, with a particular 
impact on women. At first sight, such swings seem quite a world apart from high 
technology which on the contrary tends to be associated with ideas of science and 
rationality and suggests a masculine world. It is therefore surprising at first sight that 
the field of mobile telephony has, for a number of years now, shown signs of being 
impacted by fashion logics. The pioneer, there, was Nokia. Since 1995, the Finnish 
company has been using the imagery of fashion in its self-presentations, discourses 
and communications campaigns. At the beginning, it may be that the encounter 
between Nokia and fashion was a chance, or at best an emergent, happening. 
Progressively, however, the company made it a conscious strategy to appropriate 
elements of the fashion business model and to re-inject them into its actions.  
During that same period, Nokia was becoming an iconic company in the field of 
mobile telephony, turning into a leader of that industry and a key role model. This 
meant that the moves of the Finnish company were soon closely studied and often 
imitated. After Nokia, Motorola and Siemens in close succession and now Sony-
Ericsson have all jumped upon the bandwagon of fashion. In most recent 
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developments, the Chinese market has become the latest playground where fashion 
meets mobile telephony. The Chinese Network Solutions company TCL has been the 
most active on that market in appropriating fashion logics.  
The object of this paper is to try and understand why leading actors in a field of high 
technology believe that they could benefit from an association with a logic that has 
traditionally characterized a low-tech and cyclical industry such as that of ladies’ 
clothing. We want to understand what, in the fashion business model, could be a 
source of value creation for high technology companies.  
In order to get at these questions, we do two things. First, we define the fashion 
business model as it emerged from the woman garment industry and as it evolved 
during the 20th century. We point to what we see as its most striking features – 
symbolic production, mass customization, tight orchestration of supplier networks and 
brand management. Second, we tell the story of Nokia and its connection with 
fashion. Working on the design of handsets, Nokia encountered fashion by chance, as 
it were. This emergent strategy met with positive market reaction, media hype and 
competitors’ imitation. Fashion then became a self-conscious strategy and, we argue, 
contributed to Nokia’s recipe for success. We show how the importation of the 
fashion business model has led to a reinvention of the mobile phones industry and 
created significant value in the process, particularly for Nokia. The Finnish company 
created a blueprint for the industry, moving it closer to “cultural industries” (Hirsch 
1972). Instead of standard, mass produced and relatively lackluster commodities, 
Nokia mobile phones have been mass customized and exciting branded goods.  
From this perspective, we propose that the fashion business model may be a far-
reaching, and sound strategy for those companies that may need or want to evolve and 
that may hope to shape the standards and rules of the game in their market, industry or 
organizational field. This model, we suggest, could apply and hence diffuse well 
beyond the boundaries of the mobile telephony market towards yet new industries.  
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2 The Fashion Business Model and Setting of Fashion  
The origins of the fashion business model can be found in the structuration of the 
women’s high end garment industry in Paris, towards the middle of the 19th century. 
Ironically, the man who was instrumental in defining the first rules of the game for 
that emerging industry was an Englishman, Charles Frederick Worth. Throughout the 
second half of the 19th century and the 20th century, the high end women garment 
industry has changed somewhat and at the same time its defining principles have 
extended over to neighbouring fields – adornment and accessories, men and children’s 
clothing. We point to four defining features that emerge from the early history of the 
high end garment and adornment industry and can be decontextualized to create an 
ideal type of the fashion business model – symbolic production and management, 
mass customization, orchestration of supplier networks and control of distribution. 
 
2.1 Symbolic production 
Charles Frederick Worth was born in 1825 and from an early age, he worked in 
London as a shop assistant. Attracted by the glitters of Paris, he crossed the channel in 
1845 with nearly no money in his pocket and absolutely no knowledge of French. In 
1847, he managed to secure a selling job at Gagelin, a famous Parisian luxury mercer 
in Paris. Twenty years later, Charles Frederick Worth had created his own boutique. 
More than that, he had imposed his name, transforming it into a “seal of excellence” 
(Marly 1990) for his products and his company – what we could call today a brand.  
Worth was a man that built upon the intuition that ladies had a social need to conform 
to contemporary societal standards but also the strong desire to differentiate 
themselves. Fifty years before Simmel (1904) had identified fashion to be an 
important mechanism in sociology – at par with other mechanisms such as interaction, 
play, style, and the metropolis - Charles Frederick Worth had already in practice 
exploited the power of this mechanism. Charles Frederick Worth became a master at 
turning symbolic management into commercial profits. He proved instrumental in 
institutionalizing the close association between the fashion mechanism and the 
women’s clothing and adornment industry.  
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Charles Frederick Worth defined himself as an artist. He construed himself as 
applying the standards and principles of fine art to dress design and elevating the 
subject to a higher plane. He positioned his work as part of aesthetics, reconstructing 
in the process the dressmaking industry as a cultural industry. One key source source 
of his inspiration for dress designs came from the past, particularly as it was reflected 
in art. From the moment he arrived in Paris, he spent a lot of time in museums 
studying paintings; he leafed through albums of drawings, and hunted through 
collections artworks. From this, he arrived at an aesthetics whereby la modernité 
s’inspirait de l’histoire; that is, “modernity built upon history” (Marly 1990).  
While recognized pieces of art and history were bottomless reservoirs for Worth’s 
creativity, he also found inspiration in another fashion, one less traditional than the 
first. Worth exploited the contemporary world around him, his proximate 
environment, for creative ideas. In that he was very much a pioneer in the aesthetic 
and artistic world of the time. Ideas for fashion and for sustaining the fashion could 
come from anywhere. “It was seeing acrobats in sleeve jackets that inspired him to 
create jackets; it was Empress Eugénie’s interest in the Scottish side of the family 
together with Victoria’s fondness for Balmoral that led him to use tartan sashes and 
trimmings on dresses. It was the French conquest of Algeria that led to Worth using 
the burnous as a wrap” (Marly 1990). Ideas even came “from the street”, as when the 
victory of Garibaldi in Italy meant that red shirts and pill-box hats became all the 
rage.   
In the end, Worth did not sell dresses – for those who could afford it, he marketed a 
world where life was an exciting chase of aesthetic experiences of changing fashions 
of dress and style. And, even for those who did not have the means to get access to 
this dynamic and exciting world, he represented a dream worthy of aspiration and 
reverence. While his creative talent can explain part of his success, the other part has 
to do with the characteristics of his base of clientèle. The Worth model of business 
and lifestyle marketing came of age during the Second Empire in France – and this is 
not at all surprising. The nobility in power then was new nobility, a nobility of 
parvenus who had only recently or suddenly risen to their position of wealth and 
power and had not yet gained the prestige, dignity, or manner of the earlier nobility. 
Unlike the old nobility that was gentlefolk or men and women by tradition and 
identity fully disconnected from working life, his “new nobility” was involved both 
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with work and with leisure; this new class believed in science and progress, and it had 
revolutionary visions of industrializing and commercializing nations and nation-
states. Since this customer group did not have inherently and deeply “in its blood 
differentiating principles and characteristics”, it would look for ways to differentiate 
itself and express its “superiority” in the sphere of appearance (Marly 1990), rather 
than in the inner sphere of tradition and identity as did the old nobility. The search for 
meaning in form rather than in structure made the new nobility a right target for the 
commercialization and spread of symbolic products and the fashion mechanism.  
 
2.2 Mass customization 
By any standards of the time, Maison Worth was very large. The average Parisian 
dressmaker employed a maximum of 40 seamstresses. Worth maybe began with 20 in 
1858 but, by 1870, and through to his death in 1895, he had 1,200 of them. Worth ran 
in fact was what “behind the golden façade a factory where 1,200 pairs of hands 
turned out parts which Worth fitted together. He would have scorned the word factory 
himself but that in scale and operations was what it amounted to” (Marly 1990).  
In the spirit of the dawning industrial age, Worth embraced advances in industrial 
technology to satisfy the large and increasing demand for his dresses. Contemporary 
improvements in loom technologies made it possible to produce fabrics, drapes and 
materials on a wider scale and to significantly increase productivity. The invention 
and experiment of the sewing machine some thirty years earlier, and three decades of 
its development and improvement, had amounted to a major revolution without which 
one cannot understand Worth’s adventure. There were also other fairly recent 
technological developments playing an important role in the story of Maison Worth. 
The intensification of railways and the coming of steamships also helped explain the 
“global” dimension of Worth’s impact. Thanks to these kinds of new technologies, he 
could gather an international clientèle and spread his name and influence well beyond 
French national borders. The glory, the glamour and the artistic pronouncements 
associated with the name of Worth relied upon industrialization. Both Worth and 
luxury fashion were the products of an industrializing and industrial age! 
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At the same time, Worth had to work with or rather around a number of societal 
constraints, some of which reflected in fact on the size of the potential market. The 
Second Empire in France was a period of intense social activity and numerous social 
happenings. Lavish spending and entertaining was the order of the day and the 
Imperial court in France tried to signify its power and radiance. At the French 
Imperial court itself, there were four main balls a season – somewhere between 2,000 
and 2,500 women attended each of them. One of the new constraints that bore on 
society women was that they could not wear the same dress twice at social 
happenings. Even if Worth did only half of the dresses thus demanded by society, this 
still meant that Maison Worth had to produce about four times a thousand dresses 
each season - just for the Imperial balls. To that, one can add not only the numerous 
private balls and the day wardrobes and the special service of the Empress and her 
ladies in waiting but also increasingly the foreign courts and rich customers. This 
clearly meant a huge market demand - for which craft-like processes were indeed not 
adapted. 
Another curious constraint was that all women at Court evening events had to dress in 
white. This made it indeed all the more impressive to achieve the feat of creating 
1,000 dresses four times a season, all in whites and without any single one of them 
being exactly the same as the other. In practice, this was achieved by designing 
variations around central themes or core elements – Worth called them “declinations” 
– in a creative process quite in line with what, today, we would call “modularity.” For 
each category of dress piece (body, sleeves, skirt, etc.) there were a small number of 
standardized variants. Worth also evolved standardized patterns of assembly. The 
variants were mass produced and the interchangeable parts assembled differe tly each 
single time to create unique dresses under the personal supervision of Worth, the 
artist. “Thus it was possible for a dress to consist of standard bodice A with sleeves 
pattern B and skirt pattern C.” (Marly 1990). The long seams and the trimmings of 
these pieces were put together on the sewing machine. The finishing and the 
embroideries were done by hand. What added to the singularity of each dress was the 
unique combination in each case of ribbons, feathers, flowers and decorations. 
The scale of the market in the making – sheer numbers and the quantities of dresses 
being produced – is in itself quite impressive. Beyond that, however, the speed and 
reactivity that the market required were also quite stunning. It happened quite often 
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that Worth would have to make a dress in the morning for the evening or even 
sometimes in a couple of hours. This could particularly be the case for dresses that 
went to the Imperial court. 
 
2.3 Orchestration of supplier networks 
This process of mass customization, high speed and reactivity was made possible by a 
precise articulation of a dynamic set of requirements expressed to a dense network of 
trusted suppliers. Charles Frederick Worth relied upon a number of well structured 
industrial districts of high quality craftsmen and small producers of ornaments. This 
collaboration could sometimes go quite far, as when Worth allowed a bonnet maker to 
operate on the ground floor of his establishment. He would refer customers directly to 
this bonnet maker for creations that would match the dresses he had created.  
 
As a legacy from his early days as a salesman at Gagelin, Worth nurtured tight and 
privileged relationships with fabric manufacturers and producers, in particular with 
those in Lyon. Meanwhile, the other dressmakers found it nearly impossible to 
encounter the sales representatives of the original rare-fabric producers, having to 
approach the rare-fabric producers through the mediation of drapers and mercers. The 
mutual trust and respect as well as the long lasting nature of collaborations between 
the Lyonese fabric mills and Worth meant that he would get the best fabrics, while his 
competitors did not. The competitive advantage of direct links to the fabric mills in 
Lyon meant Worth could demand great reactivity on the part of his suppliers. He was 
able to intervene ahead of time in the fabric production process – asking for particular 
colors, patterns or even materials instead of buying passively what the mills were 
producing. This tight interaction, upstream, between the client (Worth) and the 
suppliers (the mills) was quite unique and undeniably ahead of its time. 
 
2.4 Brand management and communication  
Worth first began to get an inkling of the power of his visions while he still was 
selling drapes and material at Gagelin. A few “live models” were being used in the 
store to propose to clients in real life setting the few shawls and mantels that Gagelin 
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sold along with the drapes. Worth worked with one of the models, Marie-Augustine 
Vernet, who would soon become his wife. With the idea of creating a neutral 
background for shawls and mantels, Worth had made a few white dresses for Marie. 
This did not have, however, the expected effect on the client. In contrast to asking for 
the the shaw and mantel being displayed with the dress, it turned out that the client by 
a curious logic would notice only the dress, and ask for a similar kind of a dress to be 
created for her [who wass “client”? A “him”, “her”, “a married couple”, or a “man 
and misstress”?]. This episode made Charles Frederick Worth realize the power of 
live modeling and was to be critical in helping to catapult his career from an ordinary 
salesman of drapes and material into a dressmaker guru of his time.  
 
Throughout her life, Marie would play a symbolic and iconic role in relation to her 
husband’s business – today we would call her a “fashion setter”. The world was 
watching Marie and a “change in her attire could produce a change overnight in the 
whole French Imperial court” and, by extension, in time, in Europe’s noble classes, on 
one hand, and in America’s new bourgeoisie or upper middle classes, on the other 
hand (Marly 1990). 
 
Worth set up his own house with a Swedish associate – Worth et Boberg, later Maison 
Worth – in 1858 and began to build upon his flair at symbolic management. He was 
convinced from the start that to do that he needed to get a close association with an 
opinion leader in his clientele. This woman would be a woman of society, but also a 
woman who would be a risk taker and would not be afraid of regularly breaking off 
conventions. He found that opinion leader, a maker of opinions for others, in the 
person of Princess von Metternich, the wife of the Austrian Ambassador to Paris. This 
woman was very interested in dress and she had absolutely no inhibitions about 
wearing anything that might be considered too daring by others. In fact, she took a 
positive delight in being reckless and sensational. Worth approached her by offering 
her two evening dresses at a ridiculously low price. She liked the dresses, wore them 
at Court, and soon all the women at Court would only talk about that.  
 
For many years after that, Princess von Metternich played together with Marie Worth 
the role of the avant garde in the fashion cycle that was run and managed by Worth. 
That cycle was self-perpetuating. Fashion setters in the model of Marie Worth and 
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opinion leaders in the model of Princess von Metternich set the trends and created a 
craving for particular designs or innovations. Royal and noble clients followed suit. 
The patronage of those clients in turn was the surest way to trigger interest and desire 
in rich upper middle classes who were trying to “buy” their way into a mythical 
experience of nobility and admiration on the part of the less noble. Once a particular 
fashion and particular kind of design had diffused widely – no longer the sign of the 
avant garde or the exceptionally fashion conscious - time was ripe for launching a 
new fashion and its delineations.  
 
The value of Worth’s name and of the brand associated with it made it quickly 
possible for him and Maison Worth to charge extremely high prices. In 1869, a 
bourgeois professional man would earn around £500 a year when an evening gown at 
Worth would cost about £100. The average yearly dress allowance of the bourgeois 
woman, supposed to cover all her dress needs for a year, would be at the most about 
£200, or enough to buy two dresses from Worth. In this way, by the end of the 1860s, 
Charles Frederick Worth was making more than £40,000 a year in profits. Financially, 
he belonged to the same class as the choice set of his royal and imperial customers.  
  
To some extent, it could be argued that Worth invented and pioneered “brand 
management”. He created an industry where there had been a few small, independent 
and relatively anonymous couturières and tailors working for a market serving a very 
narrow fringe of the population. Charles Frederick Worth helped reinvent the meaning 
of ladies’ dresses within this market. When dresses had been made at home and had 
generally been kept for many years if not handed over from one generation to the 
next, they now became fashion items. Charles Frederick Worth built up his name, 
turning it in time into a brand that would be associated with quality, creativity, and 
fashion.  
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3 The Digital Revolution and Bumping into Fashion  
 
Since the 1980s, Nokia’s strategic intent had been to create an information socioety 
by brokering citizens with new technologies, infotainment and transactions (Nokia, 
2000b; cf. e.g. Kairamo 1983). Nokia had sought to create technological and social 
infrastructure before consumers ever saw the first generation mobile phone as directly 
useful, fun or meaningful. Yet, it was only in 1995 that the penetration of first 
generation analogue and second-generation digital phones in Finland, its domestic 
market, grew to 15 per cent of the country's population. Lead GSM users in the 
Nordic countries were beginning to have several terminals: one for voice services, 
another for data transmission. Penetration accelerated also outside Finland.  
With Nokia’s increasing sales, large amounts of sales data became available to it. 
Nokia used data mining of consumer purchases and feedback in its chase of the 
information society. The data mining revealed that users considered Nokia a 
surprisingly feminine in comparison to rival brands. The data mining also revealed 
that most consumers treated technologies as unreliable and unnecessary extras. Or, 
they only used them for entertainment. The more there were users of these two kinds, 
the more society was moving away from Nokia’s goal of an information society.  
Rather than worry about the apparent tension between reality and its goal, Nokia’s 
marketing management reacted to the call from the market. Nokia introduced styling 
and fashion in its handsets. The 2110 phone, introduced in 1995, enabled consumers 
to “personalize” their mobile phones with accessories, such as removable and 
exchangeable colour “skins”. This phone began to appear in newspapers and 
magazines and on TV in a new light. The media coverage reified it as a cultural 
artefact and added a unique aura to the interaction of Nokia with the users if its 
products. In 1996 or 1997, Nokia phones became to represent the ultimate in 
contemporary fashion. Nokia gained a critical lead over Ericsson and Motorola. As 
the Industrial Revolution had created a bourgeoisie with its particular fashion in 
ladies’ dresses, so the Communications Revolution of the 1990s also created a “new 
class”. An individualistic desire to display taste and social mobility combined with a 
desire to gain approval from social arbiters of taste and from the social circles to 
which the class wished to belong. Particularly interesting in Nokia’s case was that the 
emergence of fashion in mobile phones in the mid-1990s took Nokia by surprise. 
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3.1 A personal legacy in art and design 
The background to the events of the mid-1990s was that Kari Kairamo was born in 
1932 and from an early age, attracted attention as a born leader in industry. He came 
from an affluent and prominent Finnish family. His father had been President of 
Nokia Group, a major forestry and rubber works, his grandfather was the founder of a 
major bank, and his wife was a pianist. He had the financial, social and intellectual 
capital to make a mark in Finnish industry (Saari 2001). 
Attracted by the modernity of the Americas, he crossed the Atlantic in 1964 to market 
Finnish paper machines. At first, he lived in Brazil. A year later, he moved to the 
United States. After experiencing Finland and Brazil, Kairamo became fascinated by 
the capacity of the United States to create wealth. The U.S. model where technology 
and multiple points of view were subordinated to private-wealth creation was in 
exciting contrast to the Finnish model where societal consensus and uniformity were 
rules of the game. When he came back to Finland, his unique combination of financial 
and social capital and intellectual drive made him easy to pick from the crowd. In 
1977, he was named the President and CEO of Nokia Group, then a conglomerate 
operating across industries such as forestry, rubber, electric cables, and public-radio 
networks.  
Kairamo developed a vision and for Nokia that would transform both Nokia and 
Finnish industry. Whereas the infrastructure of the industrial society was 
“transportation” (railroads, highways etc) the infrastructure of the new information 
society was to be “communication”, the cable, broadband, digital TV, optical fibre 
technologies that combined data, text, voice, sound and image (Nokia, 2000a). The 
new technologies would diffuse science-based benefits of computers and telephony in 
terms of “progress and flexibility”, earlier been reserved for “high-tech” and large 
businesses, into small businesses and to citizens. Citizens would store, transmit and 
make extensive use of knowledge in a digital form. Unlike the scarce goods and 
commodities of the industrial age, the good of the communication age was 
“information” in digital form that would never be “used up".  
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3.2 Communication and brand management  
“Progress and flexibility” was Kairamo’s most favourite phrase. When talk of Nordic 
deregulation in telephony began at the dawn of the 1980s, he noticed that Nokia had 
since 1960 supported an electronics unit that also made mobile phones for the 
military, police, and other such users that limited access to their networks. He shifted 
attention to enlarging access to these cellular networks.  
Timo H.A. Koski, one of his subordinates, shifted some of the emphasis in “progress 
and flexility” into an emphasis on the “user perspective” and the benefits of 
convergence of technologies for Nokia and citizens like. The belief was that new 
technology ought to be used in a rich, meaningful, and enlightened way, or put into 
productive use, and never passively accepted. The ideal Nokia employe and the idea 
citizen would “live like a Frenchman and work like a German”. Koski was 
particularly keen on making telephony and data networks user-friendly and accessible 
also to the citizen who was a novice with high technology.  
In the visions of Kairamo and Koski, most citizens had little with which to build the 
initial link between their needs or wants and the technology’s potential. Many would 
look into the past for established models of use for guidance on how to experience 
and interpret new applications. Others would expect from the producer a tightly 
configured “stage”, script and audience. They would prefer a fixed no-nonsense 
script, clear choices of the central actors, and narrow range of meanings that can be 
deciphered from the performance of each given new technology (Ainamo and Pantzar 
2000). Kari Kairamo had visions; Koski developed these into plans and actions. 
There were no courses on product architecture in the education of engineers. Nokia’s 
engineers turned to a professional product designer in industry. The designer was 
given the stack of components that were the essence of the technology and a simple 
brief: to devise a product concept by creating physical linkages between them. The 
designer used his wide experience of product architectures in diverse industries to 
come up with a satisfactory configuration of hardware components so that the project 
could proceed (Pulkkinen 1997). 
When Nokia's and Ericsson’s phone handsets were introduced to the markeplace in 
1981 for the the Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) network, Nokia’s phone was no 
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major technological breakthrough. Because of the newness of the technology, the 
phone was also prohibitively expensive. If somebody had a mobile telephone, he or 
she was differentiated from the others by virtue of that phone. In the first stage, it was 
top managers in Finland, Sweden and Norway that became the lead users. 
For Kairamo, citizens across the Western World had a social need to conform to 
contemporary societal standards that was stronger than the desire to differentiate. 
Mobile telephony was not the most imminent point of convergence of technology and 
society. In the late 1980s, he orchestrated a string of acquisitions of television and 
computer factories for Nokia. He became a master at turning symbolic management 
into an instrument to institutionalizing the close association between Nokia’s 
transformation from a forest industry firm growth into an information technology and 
communications firm and the transformation of Finnish industry. Nokia developed its 
corporate brand with an advertising campaign in Sweden in the expectation that there 
would soon be convergence between information and communication technologies, 
on one hand, and between these technologies and society, on the other hand.  
While Kairamo’s vision about the convergence would prove out to be a road to 
market success, the roadmap of how to get to that point in the future included major 
discrepancies in terms of distance to be covered and time to market. In particular, 
Nokia’s enlargement into televisions proved a drastic failure. It put Nokia in double 
jeopardy. Nokia had planned to finance the increasing research and development costs 
in mobile phones with profits from televisions. Now it had both used all of its funds in 
foolhardy venture and lacked future cash flow. Overworking himself in this situation, 
Timo H.A. Koski died of a stroke in 1988. Depressed, Kari Kairamo committed 
suicide eight months later.  
In part by design and in part by chance, Kairamo and Koski had grown Nokia ten-fold 
in size and transformed the business-to-business firm into a strong consumer brand in 
the Nordic countries. Yet, now, Nokia fought for its survival. Nokia began to sell of 
its business: first rubber, forest industries, and cable industries, then computers and 
television. Under leadership of a new CEO, Jorma Ollila, Nokia created a turnaround 
strategy in 1992. Brand management and industrial design of mobile phones remained 
the cornerstones of its new strategy: “focus, telecom, customer benefit”. With 
financing from foreign investors, Nokia barely survived. 
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It was in 1991 that the Global System for Mobile telephones (GSM), the world's first 
digital network for cellular phones opened in Finland. The digital GSM platform was 
technologically superior to the analog NMT network. The new network also quickly 
gathered critical market mass in the Nordic countries in terms of, first, building a 
network, second, in terms of phones to the business sector and, third, in terms of 
phones to consumers. Consumption patterns of mobile phones were only in their early 
stages of emergence. In preparation for increasing returns its market penetration, 
Nokia’s top management team put new emphasis on making Nokia a global brand 
(Vanjoki 2002). 
3.3 Orchestration of design, development and supplier networks 
Nokia had from the 1960s organized the development of its most radically new 
technologies and concepts on the basis of ad hoc teams. Technologies in mobile 
telephony had suffered from a lack of universal technological standards. There were 
still significant differences across countries. In some countries the end-customer was 
the king, whereas in other countries network operators were key intermediaries. In the 
U.S. textbook model of cross-subsidization, Nokia’s began to treat mature 
technologies and markets as cash cows that funded operations in new and emerging 
ones. Nokia sought to “black-box” or standardize what was “old and everyday” to 
grow volume and develop economies of scale and growing profits. Nokia exploited 
old applications to move faster and more flexibly into exploration of new exciting 
technological possibilities and their applications. It made new product launches fit the 
“irreversibilities” of earlier design choices and technological progress.  
The basic advantage of the new “cellular” or mobile digital phones was that software 
was easier to adapt to suit particular markets than fully hardware-based analogue 
technology. Nokia began to offer its various business customers and individual 
consumers a diversity of phones concepts to cater for old and new generations of 
phones, as well as for the various standards of different markets. 
Nokia’s now classic 2100 series GSM phones, launched in 1994, that took its 
inspiration from automobile design proved a phenomenal success. To cope with 
phenomenally growing demand, Nokia adopted state-of-the-art entreprise-wide 
resource planning and perfected its product platforms in the model of the automobile 
industry (Vanjoki 2002), managing to implement these practices virtually overnight 
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across its businesses and geographic locations (Koivukoski 2002, Kulkki & Kosonen 
2002). Thanks to the superior monitoring made possible by the ERP system, in 1996, 
when there was a serious fire at a Philips’s plant in the Netherlands, Nokia was faster 
than its customers to negotiate new delivery time tables for components that had been 
ordered, thus gaining a critical lead over Ericsson, its Swedish rival.  
In 1998, Nokia organized its newest and and most radical technologies in a totally 
new division called New Ventures. Digital home platforms based on IP technologies, 
WAP-related products, visually rich display devices, and new start-up businesses and 
technologies were not yet in the traditional scope of Nokia business. Nokia developed 
a roadmap with “time slots” for the introduction of new technologies and products In 
1999, pre-programmed for years in advance. With the European national auctions of 
licenses for licences for 3rd generation “universal mobile telephone system” (UMTS), 
Nokia lobbied the European Commission for a Pan European “information society”, 
marking a return to its 1980s intent of building an information society for citizens. 
 
3.4 Appropriating the fashion logic: from mass customization to “personalization” 
In an interesting twist to its information-society intent, Nokia for a number of years in 
late 1990s openly proclaimed that there were critical differences in the capacities of 
consumers to appreciate new technology. During those years, it believed that when 
there was no pre-determined script for interaction, lead users were superior to other 
customers in understanding a complicated technology or way of use, persisting with 
the use of new applications despite initial difficulties, and providing a model for the 
others in terms of how to incorporate the new into everyday life. These consumers 
possessed high initial levels of capacity to “read” and interpret new technologies. 
They had intimate knowledge of a multitude of earlier models or scripts from their use 
of older technologies. They improvised with these old models to experiment with a 
new technology, mixing and matching to come up with their critical interpretations 
and to possess their unique versions of the application. Interaction stimulated the 
active consumers’ open responses and grows their capacity to “read” and interpret 
new technologies to ever-higher levels. In this frame, the process of channeling the 
new into the everyday was a three-way relationship between Nokia, consumers that 
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actively shaped demand with their responses, and consumers who brought in the sales 
volume.  
The mid-1990s was a time, when new subscribers swarmed into the second generation 
networks. In Finland, the penetration rate of mobile phones was 38 per cent in 
December 1997. Even the possession and display of a normal second generation 
digital phone began to approach the limits as a signal of differentiation from the 
masses. The prices of many phones were falling. It was precisely at this time that 
mobile phone became “fashion items” with consumers competing who had the most 
recent and the most expensive phone. Penetration climbed to 60 per cent by December 
1998. At that time, with penetration exceeding 20 per cent, and accelerating just as in 
Finland a year before, mobile phones became fashionable in Italy, Portugal and the 
U.K. The 3rd generation “universal mobile phone system” was a technological vision 
still too distant to excite the average consumer.  
Within this context, Nokia commissioned studies on how to turn its slightly femine 
brand image, in contrast to its rivals, to its advantage (Rantala 1996). Nokia began to 
encourage its designers to propose new concepts that complied with the new 
orientation and to keep proposing them again and again until the concepts were dealt 
with adequately in one or the other of the producer’s divisions. The new Nokia way 
was now increasingly based on designers having tacitly internalized a norm of 
“interaction”, rather than artistry or direct supervision, direct control or directly 
measurable results (Nuovo, 2000).  
Nokia began to employ designers complied with two contradictory demands: 
architectural austerity and frivolous fashion (Ainamo & Pantzar 2000). It put more 
and more emphasis on winning the hearts of consumers by “medializing” (Salovaara, 
2000) its products. Nokia's design statement, including head designer Frank Nuovo's 
interviews and the producer’s creative ways of launching new products, made it a 
pioneer in electronic industry.  
Even though the interest in its phones as fashion had taken Nokia by surprise, Nokia 
did not take long to appropriate the fashion logic. Exploiting the possibilities of the 
new technologies, Nokia launched a diverse range of mobile phones that has excited 
some consumers but challenged others. Nokia interacted with consumers to trigger 
market-pull for third generation phones. Nokia provided special ad hoc teams of 
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designers with resourcees to interact with innovative consumers and other customers 
and users worldwide. These teams used radical new design methods.  
For example, Nokia launched its Nokia 8210 in 1999 during the Paris fashion week at 
the thirtieth anniversary celebration of Kenzo design: 'Nokia enters the Kenzo world 
of fashion...Nokia as the world’s leading design house for mobile communication. 
(Nokia, 2000b). Rather than stopping analysis at the level of sales statistics, Nokia 
used “contextual design”; that is, its design teams placed Nokia’s prototypes, 
products, consumers, and themselves in unique laborary settings. There was friction-
free user-producer interaction with end-users to collect, analyze, and interpret their 
experiences and stories. Like musicians in a jazz quartet, Nokia’s management let 
special teams improvise within given limits. These limits included Nokia trying to 
fund these teams at least in part with direct sales revenue. This contact with the 
market mechanism promoted a culture that encouraged the teams to stay sensitive to 
consumer feedback.  
In 2000, Nokia spun off a firm called Vertú, a venture specializing in fully customized 
mobile phones for the nouveaux riches. Frank Nuovo, Nokia’s chief designer, 
remained Vertú’s chief designer, but the venture was spun off, because Nokia was 
“dedicated to the mass market” (Nokia 2001).  Nokia’s marketing analysis and 
enterprise resource planning showed that it was time for “personalization” in terms of 
an “open-source” combination of Nokia’s technology with streams of data and 
accessories controled by the mass market autonomously of Nokia, rather than Nokia 
pushing a proprietary set of modular solutions to the market (Vanjoki 2001)  
 
4. Differences and commonalties in the two cases 
The cases of fashion in ladies’ clothing and fashion in mobile clearly involve 
differences. The two cases took place about a hundred years apart. In the case of 
Worth, fashion was a case by design and individual fiat. In the case of Nokia, fashion 
was a case of chance and more than one than person. In the traditional fashion 
business model in the area of ladies’ clothing, interacting, local traditions and legacies 
differentiated local firms from their global rivals (Djelic and Ainamo, 1999). In the 
business model of mobile telephony, users “roamed” from one region to another 
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which is why there are clear benefits to explicit technological platforms that work 
across different localities in a friction-free manner. Rather than fashion being part of 
the sociology of a local community as in the traditional model by Worth, fashion was 
a truly global phenomenon in the mobile phones of the late 1990s.   
Yet, there are also commonalties. Both ladies’ dresses during the Second Empire and 
mobile phones in the early 1990s were at first almost prohibitely expensive. At the 
same time, rules of the game both enabled and required the manufacturer to take 
many features of the product as 'givens'. In the end, the rules of the game 
institutionalized. In the case of ladies’ clothing, this took the form of Chambre 
Syndicale de la Haute Couture; in mobile phones, the global agreement about 2nd 
generation GSM and 3rd generation UMTS network protocols. In both cases, wide 
agreement across the market began to determine the actions of also the producers, 
instead of only consumers. Production prices bagan to come down at a faster pace 
than did the prestige of donning the product. 
In both cases, standardization destroyed the source of fashion; that is, the lack of the 
capacity of consumers to fully comprehend the new technologies. Worth developed 
followers and the firm is no longer active in ladies’ clothing. In the case of Nokia, 
“followers” such as Motorola and Ericsson already pre-dated Nokia in the telephony 
market. Yet, the fact that technologies in third generation mobile phones continued to 
grow in terms of layers of the technological platform and number increased the need 
for codification and standardization – and maintained a need for fashion logic. Within 
this context, Nokia curbed the fashion logic of its designers but did not totally forbid 
it. 
As the case of Charles Frederick Worth shows, while technology is not a deterministic 
instrument of change, it is an initiator that poses material for cultural and societal 
change by changing standards of instrumental reasons, symbolic reason, or both. 
Mobile phones did not suddenly become an essential part of the information society 
as terminal devices that extended the functions and other benefits of cellular 
telecommunications systems for citizens. At first, they were non-essential parts of the 
lives of lead customers. In neither the case of ladies’ clothing or mobile phones, the 
new business model did not emerge full-blown, like Minerva out of the head of Jove. 
Instead, a different facet emerged in interaction with older models of the time.  
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While the 19th century was one of talented individual tinkerers, by the late 20th 
century, the interactions of technological and business models had become so 
complex that only systematic research and development typically would act as the 
handmaidens of invention and innovation. Whereas the Industrial Revolution had 
people move from the country-side into cities and metropolis, the Communications 
Revolution brought about television, computers and mobile telephony that also broke 
people away from their traditional community and made them part of the “global 
village” or “information society”. In fact, the very end of the 20th century popularized 
visions of sharing intellectual capital to an extent that there would be an end to 
scarcity of bandwidth used in information and telecommunications technologies. The 
dot.com boom, the American Iridium satellites, and the European race for the 3rd 
generation mobile telephony promised an end to the slowness of Internet access speed 
and to the scarcity of radio bandwidth in mobile telephony, offering a promised of 
unlimited communication. The old distinctions in communication among telephone 
(voice), television (image), computer (data), and text (fascimile) appeared to break 
down all at once.  
While technological progress and Industrial Revolution created a new new 
bourgeoisie with its particular fashion so did the Communications Revolution of the 
early 1990s create a new fashion and a “new class” with its particular version of 
social mobility and a desire to display its taste and gain approval of the social arbiters 
of the different circles to which it sought belong. In the society in which this new 
class was embedded, some products could be mass-distributed at low cost, while 
others would remain inherently scarce. Only a limited number of people could enjoy 
the latter kind of product. Within the increasingly mass-communicated world, social 
class became a set of shadows, consumerism a way of life.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Human beings have always communicated with one another so that some sort of 
“transmission capacity” has been scarce. Every communication infrastructure 
involves a social order and its own particular “gatekeepers”, the ones who determine 
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or shape the tastes of those within a like-minded circle, who are the opinion leaders to 
influence the acceptance of new styles, products, entertainment, and so on.  
Within this view of sociology, the two cases point to the view that consumers or anu 
other social category may use new technologies in more than one way. When their 
ways of use diverge rather than converge they feed back into the process of change, 
nourishing fashion and an open-ended continuation of the process. In contrast, 
“correct use” is fixed when consumers’ ways of use converge into a single way of use. 
In channelling new technologies to consumers, a producer’s sensitivity to differences 
in consumers’ capacity to comprehend new technologies matters. By grouping 
consumers according to groups with intra-group commonalties and inter-groupo 
differences in the capacity to comprehend and experience new technologies serves 
several purposes, a producer learns to organize its interaction and experiences with 
consumers.  
We propose that within this kind of grouping of consumers according to their capacity 
and desire to pioneer the products of new technologies, also consumers learn to 
organize their interaction and experiences with producers. We propose that the 
capacity of producers and consumers to comprehend and experience new technologies 
links directly to both fashion and the emergence of the information society, both of 
which has been topics of much recent research. In times of divergence and competing 
technologies, fashion is a sociological mechanism similar to “design competition” as a 
technological mechanism. It is a temporary form of organization of experience. When 
a particular source of uncertainty that has produced a particular fashion among 
producers or consumers gives way to organized experience and a “dominant design”, 
the uncertainty and fashion become outdated and are replaced by something more 
progressive and flexible. 
